On uniqueness of L1-approximation for certain families of spline functions

Von G. Haberl

Fast computation of magnetostatic fields by Non-uniform Fast Fourier Transforms

The bottleneck of micromagnetic simulations is the computation of the long-ranged magnetostatic fields. This can be tackled on regular N-node grids with Fast Fourier Transforms in time N logN, whereas the geometrically more versatile finite element methods (FEM) are bounded to N^4/3 in the best case. We report the implementation of a Non-uniform Fast Fourier Transform algorithm which brings a N logN convergence to FEM, with no loss of accuracy in the results

Sensitivity of wardrop equilibria

We study the sensitivity of equilibria in the well-known game theoretic traffic model due to Wardrop. We mostly consider single-commodity networks. Suppose, given a unit demand flow at Wardrop equilibrium, one increases the demand by ε or removes an edge carrying only an ε-fraction of flow. We study how the equilibrium responds to such an ε-change. Our first surprising finding is that, even for linear latency functions, for every ε> 0, there are networks in which an ε-change causes every agent to change its path in order to recover equilibrium. Nevertheless, we can prove that, for general latency functions, the flow increase or decrease on every edge is at most ε. Examining the latency at equilibrium, we concentrate on polynomial latency functions of degree at most p with nonnegative coefficients. We show that, even though the relative increase in the latency of an edge due to an ε-change in the demand can be unbounded, the path latency at equilibrium increases at most by a factor of (1 + ε) p . The increase of the price of anarchy is shown to be upper bounded by the same factor. Both bounds are shown to be tight. Let us remark that all our bounds are tight. For the multi-commodity case, we present examples showing that neither the change in edge flows nor the change in the path latency can be bounded

Braess's Paradox in Wireless Networks: The Danger of Improved Technology

When comparing new wireless technologies, it is common to consider the effect that they have on the capacity of the network (defined as the maximum number of simultaneously satisfiable links). For example, it has been shown that giving receivers the ability to do interference cancellation, or allowing transmitters to use power control, never decreases the capacity and can in certain cases increase it by $\Omega(\log (\Delta \cdot P_{\max}))$, where $\Delta$ is the ratio of the longest link length to the smallest transmitter-receiver distance and $P_{\max}$ is the maximum transmission power. But there is no reason to expect the optimal capacity to be realized in practice, particularly since maximizing the capacity is known to be NP-hard. In reality, we would expect links to behave as self-interested agents, and thus when introducing a new technology it makes more sense to compare the values reached at game-theoretic equilibria than the optimum values. In this paper we initiate this line of work by comparing various notions of equilibria (particularly Nash equilibria and no-regret behavior) when using a supposedly "better" technology. We show a version of Braess's Paradox for all of them: in certain networks, upgrading technology can actually make the equilibria \emph{worse}, despite an increase in the capacity. We construct instances where this decrease is a constant factor for power control, interference cancellation, and improvements in the SINR threshold ($\beta$), and is $\Omega(\log \Delta)$ when power control is combined with interference cancellation. However, we show that these examples are basically tight: the decrease is at most O(1) for power control, interference cancellation, and improved $\beta$, and is at most $O(\log \Delta)$ when power control is combined with interference cancellation

A C0 interior penalty discontinuous Galerkin method for fourth‐order total variation flow I: Derivation of the method and numerical results

We consider the numerical solution of a fourth‐order total variation flow problem representing surface relaxation below the roughening temperature. Based on a regularization and scaling of the nonlinear fourth‐order parabolic equation, we perform an implicit discretization in time and a C0 Interior Penalty Discontinuous Galerkin (C0IPDG) discretization in space. The C0IPDG approximation can be derived from a mixed formulation involving numerical flux functions where an appropriate choice of the flux functions allows to eliminate the discrete dual variable. The fully discrete problem can be interpreted as a parameter dependent nonlinear system with the discrete time as a parameter. It is solved by a predictor corrector continuation strategy featuring an adaptive choice of the time step sizes. A documentation of numerical results is provided illustrating the performance of the C0IPDG method and the predictor corrector continuation strategy. The existence and uniqueness of a solution of the C0IPDG method will be shown in the second part of this paper

Multilateral bargaining in networks:On the prevalence of inefficiencies

We introduce a noncooperative multilateral bargaining model for a network-restricted environment, in which players can communicate only with their neighbors. Each player strategically chooses the bargaining partners among the neighbors to buy out their communication links with upfront transfers. The main theorem characterizes a condition on network structures for efficient equilibria and shows the prevalence of strategic delays. If the underlying network is either complete or circular, then an efficient stationary subgame perfect equilibrium exists for all discount factors: all the players always try to reach an agreement as soon as practicable and hence no strategic delay occurs. In any other network, however, an efficient equilibrium is impossible for sufficiently high discount factors because some players strategically delay an agreement. We also provide an example of a Braess-like paradox, in which the more links are available, the less links are actually used. Thus, network improvements may decrease social welfar

Dimension of the Torelli group for Out(F_n)

Let T_n be the kernel of the natural map from Out(F_n) to GL(n,Z). We use combinatorial Morse theory to prove that T_n has an Eilenberg-MacLane space which is (2n-4)-dimensional and that H_{2n-4}(T_n,Z) is not finitely generated (n at least 3). In particular, this recovers the result of Krstic-McCool that T_3 is not finitely presented. We also give a new proof of the fact, due to Magnus, that T_n is finitely generated.Comment: 27 pages, 9 figure